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ABSTRACT PAGE
The implicit and explicit components of the human motivational system are typically considered 
to be distinct but related, with varying implicit-explicit congruence across individuals. However, 
prior research has only measured a particular type of individual congruence, which I term 
normative congruence, individuals who are normatively congruent have similar levels of 
explicit and implicit motivation as measured on a scale centered at the sample mean. I 
propose two new ways to model congruence. First, temporal congruence can be modeled by 
longitudinally measuring motives and examining the extent to which implicit and explicit 
motivation covary across occasions. In this type of congruence, occasions are the units of 
analysis. Second, configural congruence can be modeled by measuring motives in the 
achievement, affiliation and power domains and measuring covariation across domains. In this 
type of analysis, motive contents are the units of analysis. In two weekly-diary studies, I 
measured well-being and all three types of congruence. Analyses indicated that temporal and 
configural congruence were negatively related to each other. Normative congruence was not 
consistently related to well-being, configural congruence was a highly robust predictor of 
greater well-being, whereas temporal congruence was a moderately robust predictor of lower 
well-being. Configural congruence may be beneficial because it entails having one’s identity 
aligned with one’s strongest implicit motives, an alignment which drives the adoption of life 
goals that one is motivated to pursue. Temporal congruence may be detrimental because it 
predicts a lack of compensatory processes to maintain explicit goal pursuit on occasions when 
implicit motivation lags. Thus, implicit-explicit congruence is not a unitary construct; there are 
different types of congruence that have unique implications for well-being.
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Three Types of Motive Congruence: Normative, Configural and Temporal
The human motivational system comprises an implicit component and an explicit 
component (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Spangler, 1992). The implicit 
component is not accessible to the conscious mind and its contents must be elicited 
through indirect means (McClelland et ah, 1989; Smith, 1992; Winter, 1973). The 
explicit component is accessible to the conscious mind and its contents can be elicited 
through verbal self-report instruments (McClelland, 1980; McClelland et ah, 1989). One 
of the enduring enigmas in research on these two systems is that implicit-explicit motive 
congruence within individuals tends to be weak— most people have implicit motives that 
only weakly correspond with their explicit motives (Thrash, Cassidy, Maruskin, & Elliot, 
2010; Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012).
Compounding this enigma is the puzzling finding that motive congruence does 
not have a consistent relationship with well-being (Thrash et al., 2012). Even though 
theory on motivation predicts that people would experience greater subjective well-being 
if their explicit pursuits were aligned with their implicit motives (because of the 
subsequent affective rewards) research has shown that for such well-being to ensue, 
congruence is necessary but not always sufficient (Brunstein, 2010).
Although it is certainly possible that psychologists should amend their theory in 
light of these two issues, I present another possibility in this thesis, namely that these two 
issues arise from the problematic method of measuring motive congruence in a particular 
and arbitrary way, resulting in a type of congruence that I hereafter call normative 
congruence. This measurement technique entails measuring explicit and implicit motives
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across persons, and classifying an individual as congruent if he or she has similar 
standing on both variables relative to others’ standing on these variables. As alternatives 
to normative congruence, I propose two other forms of congruence: temporal congruence 
(covariation of implicit and explicit motives across time) and configural congruence 
(similarity of implicit and explicit motive profiles across content domains). I present two 
studies of how the three types of congruence are inter-related, and how each contributes 
to the prediction of well-being.
Implicit and Explicit Motives
Motives represent inclinations to seek out certain types of experiences, outcomes, 
and rewards. Implicit motives orient, select and energize behavior by causing the 
perceptual system to weigh opportunities and rewards based upon their alignment with 
the motive in question (Schultheiss, Rosch, Rawolle, Kordin, & Graham, 2010). Such 
motives arise from a system that primarily receives input and produces output non­
verbally. It is appropriate that when two early motive researchers, David McClelland and 
John Atkinson, first tested a variant of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & 
Murray, 1935) to measure implicit motives, the independent variable which they 
manipulated was hunger. The manner in which hunger immediately operates— changing 
the degree to which people seek, notice, and respond to food— is analogous to the way in 
which implicit motives operate. Just as food provides immediate bodily satisfaction when 
people are hungry, motive-correspondent goals provide an immediate affective reward 
when they are reached.
Implicit motives also engender specific profiles of threat sensitivity. If a goal is
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aligned with an aroused implicit motive, then threats and obstacles that impede progress 
toward the goal are affectively potent, while unrelated threats and obstacles are less so 
(Hall, Stanton, & Schultheiss, 2010).
There are a limited number o f implicit motives, and they are typically classified 
into three domains: achievement, power, and affiliation. Individuals high in the implicit 
need for achievement («Ach) strive to achieve exceptional performance or produce works 
o f outstanding quality in their pursuits, especially in their chosen line of work 
(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; Pang, 2010). Individuals high in implicit 
need for power («Pow) strive to attain positions in which can exert influence on the 
greatest number of people, while being subject to the influence of the fewest number of 
people (Winter, 1973; Fodor, 2010). Individuals high in implicit need for affiliation (wAff) 
strive to create and maintain close, intimate relationships with people, and fear the 
dissolution of these relationships (Heyns, Veroff, & Atkinson, 1958; Weinberger, Cotier,
& Fishman, 2010).
Although each of these motives can be temporarily aroused in any person through 
manipulation or deprivation, people who are consistently high in a single motive domain 
are consistently sensitive to pertinent incentives. Consequently, implicit motives predict 
major trends in one’s life trajectory, such as choice of career, career success, and choice 
of romantic partner (Fodor, 2010; Winter, 1991; Winter, 2010). For instance, individuals 
high in implicit nPow have been shown to choose careers in which they can deeply 
influence others— they tend to become surgeons, psychotherapists, teachers, or pastors 
(Winter, 2010).
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In contrast with implicit motives, explicit motives are measurable through 
questionnaires and other verbal self-report instruments. In fact, the term explicit motive 
came about in part because McClelland and others argued that when psychologists who 
unwittingly tried to measure implicit motives using self-report instruments and obtained 
reliable results by doing so, these psychologists were really measuring motives that arose 
from a non-implicit system, one whose defining characteristic was its accessibility to the 
verbal system (McClelland et al., 1989). Explicit motives are also typically classified as 
belonging to the achievement domain, the power domain, or the affiliation domain. 
Unlike implicit motives, explicit motives do not predict major life choices, and people do 
not evince sensitivity at the neuronal level to incentives that correspond to explicit 
motives. Explicit motives do, however, predict controlled and verbally framed forms of 
behavior, such as responses to specific social expectations (McClelland et al., 1989), 
particularly when verbally transmitted incentives are at stake (Spangler, 1992).
The Implicit-Explicit Correlation
In early motive research, the two types of motivation were found to be 
uncorrelated (see Thrash et al., 2012), but in later work the two types of motivation were 
found to be weakly related after corrections were applied for two primarily 
methodological weaknesses. The first weakness was that the measures of implicit and 
explicit motives that were used did not correspond to one another in terms of content. 
When this flaw was corrected— when participants were evaluated with content- 
correspondent measures— people showed much higher congruence than what was 
typically found otherwise (Thrash, Elliot, & Schultheiss, 2007).
THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE 6
The second weakness was that measurement error hindered accurate calculation 
of congruence— unreliability in implicit measures became compounded with unreliability 
in explicit measures. When measurement error was corrected by using latent factor 
analysis (e.g. Thrash et al., 2010) or by dividing the correlation by the product of the 
measures' internal consistencies (e.g. Thrash et al., 2012), the implicit-explicit correlation 
was significantly higher. A more detailed review of these and other methodological 
weaknesses in the history of implicit-motive research can be found in Thrash et al. (2012). 
Implicit-Explicit Congruence
The weak correlation between implicit and explicit motives in a given domain 
implies that there are considerable individual differences in motive congruence— across 
individuals there is variance in consistency between the levels of implicit and explicit 
motives. As traditionally defined, congruent individuals have similar levels of implicit 
and explicit motives within a given domain, whereas incongruent individuals have 
dissimilar levels. I refer to this traditional operationalization of congruence as normative 
congruence, because it is the normative distributions of scores on both variables that 
determine whether an individual is congruent.
The most basic method of computing congruence scores has been to use z-score 
differences. One can compute a difference score by subtracting the explicit motive z- 
score from the implicit motive z-score and taking the absolute value of this difference 
(e.g. Kehr, 2004). Individuals with low difference scores are considered congruent, and 
those with high differences scores are considered incongruent. Thus, a person who is at 
the sample mean for explicit motivation and also at the sample mean for implicit
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motivation is highly congruent, but a person who is at the sample mean for explicit 
motivation and one standard deviation above the sample mean for implicit motivation is 
somewhat incongruent.
Other ways have also been used to model congruence normatively. For instance, 
some researchers have used polynomial regression with response surface analysis (e.g. 
Kazen & Kuhl, 2011), or tested whether one motive moderates the effect of the other (e.g. 
Hofer, Chasiotis et al., 2006). If moderators are of interest, another strategy is salient—  
testing moderation of the implicit-explicit relationship using the cross-product 
moderation test (e.g. Thrash & Elliot, 2002). What is consistent across all of these 
methods is that congruence is defined in terms of whether one's relative standing on the 
implicit motive is similar to one's relative standing on the explicit motive. It is assumed 
that the study sample has an adequate range of individuals, and that a metric based on this 
range is appropriate for every individual in the sample.
Traits Related to Implicit-Explicit Congruence
The recognition of considerable individual differences in motive congruence led 
researchers to search for traits and other variables that moderate the implicit-explicit 
motive relation. Several such moderators have been discovered in recent decades, and 
Thrash et al. (2007) have argued that these moderators are catalysts for three different 
processes: communication, integration, and resistance. The communicative factors may 
open channels of information transmission between the two motivational systems, 
leading to greater congruence. Two such factors that have received empirical support are 
private body consciousness (Thrash et al., 2007), and referential competence (Schultheiss,
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Patalakh, Rawolle, Liening, & Maclnnes, 2011). Private body consciousness refers to 
sensitivity to bodily states and changes, and referential competence refers to the ability to 
quickly translate between non-verbal and verbal stimuli. If these processes are indeed 
causes of greater congruence, it is plausible that physiological signals are being sent from 
the implicit system to the explicit system, and the sensitivity of the recipient system 
moderates the signal’s impact. The integrative factors may unify the implicit and explicit 
motivational systems. These factors include preference for consistency (Thrash et al., 
2007), identity status (Hofer, Busch, Chasiotis, & Kiessling, 2006) and self-determination 
(Thrash & Elliot, 2002; Hofer et al., 2010). The factors pertaining to resistance help the 
individual resist external pressure to change their explicit motives in directions that 
diverge from their implicit motives. Self-monitoring, which refers to the monitoring of 
others’ expectations and values, predicts the lack of such resistance. Accordingly, low 
self-monitoring predicts high congruence (Thrash et al., 2007).
Motive Congruence and Well-Being
One would expect a straightforward relationship between motive congruence and 
subjective well-being. After all, a person who is highly congruent would more frequently 
set the kinds of goals that provide potent affective rewards, thus reaping more of those 
affective rewards. Such a hypothesis would cohere with telic theories of well-being, 
which predict that satisfaction is the result of goal-oriented striving and success (Diener, 
1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Such theories rely on the assumption that a 
person’s affective states are tied to what a person is trying to achieve, whether a person is 
achieving it, and whether a person is treating the achievement in question as a reference
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standard for success (Brunstein, 2010).
Some of the literature on motive congruence tends to show this positive, linear 
association between congruence and well-being. For instance, two studies have shown 
that incongruence predicts lower levels of subjective well-being (Baumann et al., 2005; 
Kehr, 2004). In another study, it was found that congruence predicted greater life 
satisfaction, a finding which was replicated across three cultures (Hofer, Chasiotis, and 
Campos, 2006). Others have found that a low-high discrepancy in the power domain— 
one in which implicit strength was high and explicit strength was low— was predictive of 
lower levels of well-being and higher levels of stress among managers, who are likely to 
be high in implicit nPow (Kazen and Kuhl, 2011).
Consistency in such findings, however, has been lacking. At least one study has 
shown a null relationship between congruence and well-being (McAuley, Bond, & Ng, 
2004). Other studies have found a weak relationship or a moderated relationship. In the 
study by Hofer and colleagues (2006) mentioned earlier, congruence in the power domain 
predicted well-being, but congruence in the affiliation domain did not. In addition, the ill 
effects of motive incongruence have been found to be ameliorated when a person uses 
emotional disclosure as a coping strategy (Langan-Fox, Sankey, & Canty, 2009; Schuler, 
Job, Frohlieh, & Brandstatter, 2008) and when a person is high in self-directedness or 
internal locus of control (Langan-Fox et al., 2009). The beneficial effects of motive 
congruence have been found to be more evident when a person is engaging in goal- 
directed activity (Schuler et al., 2008) and when a person perceives progress (Brunstein, 
2010). On one hand, such lack of consistency may explained by positing a more robust
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theory to explicate the relationship between congruence and well-being (Brunstein, 2010). 
On the other hand, this problem suggests that congruence might need to be 
operationalized in a more effective way.
Types of Congruence
My goal in the current paper is to examine three types of congruence: normative, 
temporal and configural. Normative congruence, as presented earlier, is a measure of 
congruence that relies on the sample distribution as the reference standard for motive 
measurement and congruence calculation, and it does not consistently predict well-being. 
It also has other weaknesses as an individual-difference measure. First, a normative- 
congruence score inadequately handles the separation of people in diagonally opposite 
quadrants of the data distribution. Those in the top right quadrant and the bottom left 
quadrant are both congruent, but high-high congruence has different properties from 
low-low congruence. Similarly, those in the top left quadrant and the bottom right 
quadrant are both incongruent, but each type o f incongruence also has specific properties 
(Langan-Fox & Canty, 2010). Thus, the use of normative congruence also requires that 
one have quadrant information or that one use response surface analysis. Although this 
complexity is not necessarily a weakness— using the factor-and-quadrant approach to 
classification may be theoretically optimal— it leaves room for a more parsimonious 
single-factor approach.
Second, the calculation of normative congruence scores relies on the assumption 
that the sample is representative o f the population at large. If one’s sample is drawn from 
an undergraduate pool at a highly selective college, then the sample’s range of scores on
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either the implicit or explicit achievement motive might be restricted to an abnormally 
high range. Third, normative congruence is arbitrary because it treats the sample norm as 
a valid reference point for everyone even though individual differences may necessitate 
unique reference points for each individual. Given these weaknesses, it is worth 
considering two other way of measuring congruence: configurally (across motive 
domains) and temporally (across occasions) (Thrash et al., 2010).
Configural congruence is an indicator o f whether motive contents covary within 
an individual as one moves from one domain to the next. Such congruence represents a 
sensitivity to each domain’s strength and an apportioning of explicit motivation in a way 
that corresponds to variation between domains at the implicit level. If a person is weak in 
achievement, moderate in affiliation, and strong in power motivation at the implicit level, 
then he or she will be configurally congruent if  he or she is also proportionately weak in 
achievement, moderate in affiliation, and strong in power motivation at the explicit level. 
In simpler terms, a person who is configurally congruent has implicit-explicit profile 
similarly. People who are more configurally congruent may have attained such 
congruence by reaching a state of identity achievement (Marcia, 1966), a developmental 
state in which one is no longer exploring life options to find satisfaction, but rather has 
settled on a trajectory that provides fulfillment.
Temporal congruence is an indicator o f how strongly a person’s explicit motives 
(in particular domains) track his or her implicit motives (in corresponding domains) 
across time. Such congruence represents a greater sensitivity to daily or weekly variations 
in implicit-motive strength, such that each variation is communicated to the explicit
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system faithfully and quickly. Certainly, the communication may be in the opposite 
direction— from the explicit system to the implicit system— but given the fundamental, 
unconscious nature of the implicit motive system, it is more plausible that signals travel 
from the implicit system to the explicit system. Temporal congruence may vary across 
persons due to attributes like trait mindfulness, because mindfulness engenders greater 
sensitivity to implicit processes (Thrash et al., 2010).
The modeling of configural congruence is similar in some respects to the 
modeling of two measures that pertain to Big Five trait profiles, namely profile stability 
and within-time normativeness (see Furr, 2008; Klimstra, Luyckx, Hale, Goossens, & 
Meeus, 2010). Profile stability refers to the within-person correspondence of a person’s 
trait profile from time 1 to time 2. Within-time normativeness refers to the similarity of a 
person’s trait profile at a given occasion to the normative profile (estimated from that 
person’s peer group) on that occasion. These constructs bear some similarity to 
configural congruence because configural congruence refers to the within-person 
correspondence o f a person’s motive profile from the implicit level to the explicit level. 
However, profile stability and within-time normativeness are calculated using q- 
correlations (on the basis o f ranks), whereas configural congruence is calculated using 
slopes (on the basis o f continuous scales). Rank-ordering could have used as the basis of 
configural-congruence derivation in the current study, but the way in which implicit 
motives and explicit motives were measured allowed the use of continuous measures, 
which are more precise. Furthermore, within-time normativeness refers to person-group 
congruence, where the group attribute, i.e. the group mean, is computed and fixed.
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However, configural congruence refers to implicit-self-explicit-self congruence, where 
both the implicit attribute and the explicit attribute may vary across individuals.
The modeling o f temporal congruence is similar in some respects to the modeling 
o f tracking accuracy in dyadic research (e.g. Overall, Fletcher, & Kenny, 2012). Tracking 
accuracy refers to the precision with which actual temporal variation in person A is 
perceived by person B. If such variation is tracked with consistency, then tracking 
accuracy exists. However, such tracking accuracy is a measure o f temporal 
correspondence between persons in a dyad, whereas temporal congruence is a measure of 
temporal correspondence between motivational systems in a single individual.
Normative, configural and temporal congruence all represent correspondence 
between implicit and explicit motives at the level of individual differences, but they are 
conceptually distinct and may be empirically distinct as well. Normative congruence 
represents similarity between one’s explicit and implicit motives relative to the normative 
distributions of both variables. Configural congruence represents similarity of domain 
profiles between one’s explicit system and one’s implicit system. Temporal congruence 
represents the extent to which an individual’s implicit motive covaries with the 
corresponding explicit motive across time.
My goal in measuring each type of congruence in the current study is to compare 
three ways of thinking about individual differences in congruence and individual 
differences in well-being. Although longitudinal data can also be used to measure within- 
person variations in congruence, such variations are not the focus of the current study. 
Rather the goals of the current study are to measure the average congruence in each of the
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three types, the distinctness of the three types, the between-person variation in each type, 
and the association of each type with levels and change in well-being. I am interested in 
what it means to be a congruent person, and I aim to show that it can mean different 
things, depending on which type of congruence one is talking about.
Hypotheses
First, I hypothesized that the three types of congruence are distinct. I expected the 
correlations between the three types of congruence to be low or moderate. Second, I 
proposed a set of hypotheses concerning the relationship between each congruence and 
well-being. I predicted that all three types of congruence would positively predict well­
being, but the nature of each relationship would be unique.
Normative congruence was expected to be a positive but weak or inconsistent 
predictor of well-being because o f its weak theoretical underpinnings and its dependence 
on arbitrary distributions of scores in particular samples. The current samples’are drawn 
from college students at a competitive college, so the normative level o f explicit 
achievement motivation scores in these samples will probably have a higher mean and 
less variance than scores obtained from a general population sample, a limitation which 
will constrain the validity of the sample’s normative-congruence scores in the 
achievement domain. Similar problems may constrain the meaningfulness of normative 
congruence in other domains as well.
Configural congruence was expected to be a robust predictor of well-being, 
because a configurally congruent person tends to allocate a great amount of explicit effort 
to goals related to strong implicit needs, and a small amount of explicit effort to goals
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related to weak implicit needs. Such congruence implies an attainment of internal 
correspondence between motive profiles, an attainment which predicts that larger life 
goals, such as those pertaining to one’s education, career and family, will be set and 
prioritized based on upon which goals provide dispositional affective rewards.
Temporal congruence was also expected to be a predictor of well-being because a 
temporally congruent person is aware of the ebbs and flows of his or her implicit motives, 
and therefore tends to engage in pursuits on the occasions when those pursuits are most 
affectively rewarding, and to drop those pursuits when they are less rewarding.
According to the hierarchical model of motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997; Thrash & 
Hurst, 2008), one could conceive of a temporally congruent person as being energized by 
his or her implicit motives, appropriately channeling such energy on the occasions when 
it is available.
Although congruence of all three types is expected to be beneficial, there is a 
duality to incongruence that must be noted. In some persons, incongruence may indicate 
flexibility rather than dysfunction, because it could denote the regulatory ability to 
cognitively focus on pursuing certain goals regardless of implicit motivation levels, thus 
increasing the likelihood of goal attainment (Kehr, 2004). The flexibility interpretation 
may be most plausible in the case of temporal congruence. At the temporal level, such 
flexibility may be useful in the long run, because it causes one’s implicit and explicit 
systems to aim at consistent goals in aggregate, even though implicit motivation may lag
r -
on certain occasions. Such consistency may derive from greater volitional strength, which 
allows greater self-regulation when implicit motivation is weak (see Muraven &
THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE 16
Baumeister, 2000).
In contrast, at the configural and normative levels, incongruence is more likely to 
represent dysfunction than flexibility, because the individual's implicit and explicit 
motives would be fundamentally divergent or chronically discrepant. These 
considerations raise an alternative hypothesis regarding temporal congruence— that it is a 
negative rather than positive predictor of well-being.
Overview of Present Study
The current study used a weekly diary method to gather data from multiple 
individuals at multiple time points regarding three motive domains. This design enabled 
the operationalization of all three forms of congruence, and the modeling of both mean 
well-being and growth in well-being. Any type of congruence that predicts growth of 
well-being over time can be considered a more robust correlate of—and even a cause 
of—greater well-being. Data were analyzed using latent curve growth models in order to 
model both mean well-being and growth in well-being as dependent measures. Latent 
curve growth models were more advantageous than lagged analyses because they entailed 
the estimation of overall growth or decline in well-being rather than the aggregation of 
separate instances of growth in well-being without regard to overall trends.
The diary method was not only beneficial in gathering data at multiple time points, 
but it also removed some of the reactance and demand characteristics associated with the 
laboratory. However, the collection of data at multiple time points was primarily needed 
to calculate temporal congruence accurately, and these data cannot sufficiently address 
the question of causality, which would require many more time points.
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Researchers in the hedonic tradition have posited that subjective well-being (SWB) 
comprises not only positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) but also satisfaction 
with life (SWLS) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Meanwhile, researchers in 
the eudaimonic tradition have posited that well-being comprises variables that are related 
to psychological flourishing, such as vitality and self-actualization (Ryan & Deci, 2001; 
Ryff & Keyes, 1995). To measure these diverse forms of well-being, I measured well­
being in the present study with facets from both the hedonic tradition, which emphasizes 
pleasure and satisfaction, and the eudaimonic tradition, which emphasizes optimal 
functioning.
Method 
Participants
Participants were undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology class, 
who participated in this study to satisfy a research participation requirement.
In Sample 1, data were collected from 164 students. One participant’s data was 
excluded for not completing the preliminary questionnaire. Five participants’ data were 
excluded because they filled fewer than three weekly questionnaires on time. The final 
sample comprised 159 participants, o f whom 39.8% were male. The age range of 
participants was 18 to 23 years and the median age was 19.
In Sample 2, data were collected from 158 students. There were two cohorts of 
participants; the second cohort began the diary portion of the study one week after the 
first. One participant’s data was excluded because he or she completed fewer than three 
weekly questionnaires on time. Seven participants’ data were excluded because their data
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appeared to be invalid. The final sample comprised 150 participants, of whom 40% were 
male. The age range of participants was 17 to 45 years, and the median age was 18. 
Procedure
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The experimenters collected 
trait data from all participants using paper-and-pencil measures at the beginning of the 
study. The experimenters then informed participants that they would receive weekly 
invitations to participate in an online study with a unique URL embedded in the invitation 
email. Participants were told that these invitations would be sent out every Wednesday 
with a deadline specified in the e-mail.
The experimenters then began the collection of weekly diary-data collection over 
an eight-week period, which began at the approximate midpoint of an academic semester 
and concluded one week before final examinations. The trait data were collected for other 
purposes and will not be discussed here. For the weekly-diary portion of the study, 
participants received e-mail invitations each Wednesday and were requested to fill out an 
electronic survey at a time of their convenience between noon and 6 p.m. on that day.
The electronic surveys were administered with Opinio, a web-based data-collection tool. 
On the basis of a previous diary study (Thrash & Elliot, 2003), 5:00 AM on Thursday 
was treated as the natural cut-off point between Wednesday and Thursday. Thus, data 
submitted after 5:00 AM were treated as late and excluded from analysis.
Measures
As recommended for diary studies (Nezlek, 2012), I used abbreviated measures. 
The brevity of these measures reduced survey fatigue and promoted honest answering.
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The internal consistency for all diary measures was calculated by running an 
unconditional analysis in a three-level hierarchical linear model with measurement items 
at level one as recommended by Nezlek (2012) and Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), a 
method which produces the functional equivalent of Cronbach’s alpha (Nezlek, 2011). 
The variables below were measured weekly.
Implicit motives. A modified version of the Multi-Motive Grid (short version) 
(MMG-S; Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, & Puca, 2000) was used to measure implicit 
needs for achievement, affiliation, and power (see Appendix A). The MMG-S is an 
implicit measure, derived from the Picture Story Exercise (PSE; Koestner & McClelland, 
1992) and its predecessor, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 
1935). Like the PSE and TAT, the MMG-S comprises a series of pictures of one or more 
persons engaged in an ambiguous activity, and it requires projective interpretation on the 
part of the participants. The MMG-S contains features of implicit motive measures 
(pictures) and features of explicit measures (questions) but it is typically regarded as an 
implicit measure (e.g. Kehr, 2004; Schuler et al., 2008). I used the MMG-S instead of the 
PSE because reliability and validity are likely to be compromised when the PSE is 
repeated for several weeks. Such repetition of the PSE leads to deliberate efforts to 
modify one’s stories (Lundy, 1985; Winter & Stewart, 1977). In contrast the MMG-S has 
high test-retest reliability (Schultheiss, Liening, & Schad, 2008).
Unlike the PSE and TAT, the MMG-S does not require participants to write a 
freeform story about their interpretation of each picture. Instead, participants are 
instructed to put themselves in the position of one of the pictured persons, and are then
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presented with statements about how people in the picture might feel or think. These 
statements are oriented toward the achievement, affiliation and power motives. Examples 
of statements are “Feeling good about meeting other people,” “Trying to influence other 
people”, and “Feeling good about one’s competency.” The MMG-S does not measure 
intimacy motivation, a fourth domain (McAdams, 1989, 1992), whose similarity with 
affiliation motivation has led to its conflation with affiliation motivation (Weinberger et 
al., 2010). To be consistent with the tradition of implicit motive research in the last 
decade, I did not measure intimacy motivation in the current study.
In the original MMG-S, participants are presented with the options yes and no. To 
measure variability more precisely, these options were expanded to a seven-point 
numbered scale in the current study, where 1 indicated no and 7 indicated yes. Eleven 
pictures from the original MMG-S were used and the total number of statements was 
trimmed from 72 to 49 so that participants would not be burdened with an exceptionally 
long task, a burden which would have compromised validity. Specifically, most of the 
avoidance motive items and all filler items were deleted. The picture order was 
randomized every week but the order of statements beneath each pictures remained 
consistent. I only scored statements pertaining to the approach aspect of the motive, 
because I only wanted to measure approach motivation.
The MMG-S involved assessing participants’ perceptions at the time the survey 
was taken. In Sample 1, the internal consistency was .24 for achievement, .23 for power, 
and .02 for affiliation. In Sample 2, the internal consistency was .09 for achievement, .16 
for power, and .01 for affiliation. Such levels of consistency are common in implicit
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measures of motivation (McClelland et al., 1953; Lowell, 1953; Schultheiss, Liening, & 
Schad, 2008) because each picture exerts a different degree of motive pull, and elicits 
situation-specific motivation (e.g. education-related achievement, work-related 
achievement), which is not consistent in strength across situations (Mischel & Shoda, 
1995). Nevertheless, test-retest reliability and criterion validity are typically satisfactory 
in the MMG (Schultheiss et al., 2008; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). In Sample 1, the 
median test-retest reliability based on pairs of tests from consecutive weeks was .701 for 
achievement, .766 for power, and .731 for affiliation. In Sample 2, it was .818 for 
achievement, .831 for power, and .810 for affiliation.
Explicit motives. A measure of explicit motives was derived from a need- 
satisfaction measure created by Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, and Kasser (2001), which suited the 
current study because o f its brevity and content validity (see Appendix B). The original 
measure was created to confirm that events are felt as satisfying if they fulfill the three 
needs postulated by self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985), namely 
autonomy, competence' and relatedness. Two of these needs are isomorphic with motive 
domains: competence corresponds to achievement and relatedness to affiliation. The 
original measure also measured the factor popularity-influence with three items, and 
these items were used to measure explicit need for power in the current study.
The sentence stems were modified to assess motivations during the given week. 
For instance, the statement “During this event I felt very capable in what I did” was 
changed to “This week I have felt an impulse or desire to feel capable in what I do.” 
Three items were included for each motive domain. Participants rated their agreement on
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a scale from 1 {not at all) to 5 {very much). For Sample 1, the internal consistency 
was .42 for achievement, .32 for power, and .69 for affiliation. For Sample 2, the internal 
consistency was .53 for achievement, .34 for power, and .66 for affiliation. In Sample 1, 
the median test-retest reliability based on pairs of tests from consecutive weeks was .543 
for achievement, .594 for power, and .682 for affiliation. In Sample 2, it was .462 for 
achievement, .616 for power, and .546 for affiliation.
Well-Being. All well-being measures made reference to how the participant was 
thinking or feeling on that particular day.
Positive and negative affect. Positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) were 
assessed with the 20-item Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix C). The PA scale comprises 10 mood 
adjectives such as enthusiastic and proud , and the NA scale comprises 10 adjectives such 
as scared and hostile. Items were rated from 1 {very slightly or not at all) to 5 {extremely). 
Evidence of the reliability and validity o f the PANAS scales can be found in Watson et al. 
(1988). In Sample 1, the internal consistency was .79 for PA and .75 for NA. In Sample 2, 
the internal consistency was .78 for PA and .74 for NA.
Satisfaction with life. Participants completed the 5-item Satisfaction with Life 
Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985; see Appendix D). The SWLS measures life satisfaction 
with statements such as “I am satisfied with my life.” These were rated from 1 {strongly 
disagree) to 7 {strongly agree). Responses were summed to compute a life satisfaction 
score. For reliability and validity o f the SWLS, see Pavot, Diener, Colvin, and Sandvik 
(1991). Internal consistency was .43 for Sample 1 and .51 for Sample 2.
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Vitality. Participants completed the Subjective Vitality scale (Ryan & Fredrick, 
2007), a 7-item scale with statements such as “I have energy and spirit” and “I am 
looking forward to each new day” that were rated from 1 {not at all true) to 7 {very true) 
(see Appendix E). After recoding a reversed item, a vitality score was computed by 
summing across responses. For reliability and validity of this measure, see Ryan and 
Fredrick (1997). Internal consistency was .78 for Sample 1 and .79 for Sample 2.
Self-actualization. Participants completed a self-actualization scale by Sheldon et 
al. (2001) (see Appendix F). This 3-item scale comprises statements such as “Today, I 
feel a deeper understanding o f myself and my place in the universe” that were rated from 
1 {not at all) to 5 {very much). For evidence of prior reliability and validity, see Sheldon 
et al. (2001). Internal consistency was .69 for Sample 1 and .75 for Sample 2. 
Computation of Normative, Configural, and Temporal Congruence Indexes
Based on the weekly data, I derived a normative-congruence score, a configural- 
congruence score and a temporal-congruence score for each participant. For all variables 
that were derived in the analyses below, I examined skewness and kurtosis. Data 
transformations were applied as appropriate to reduce skewness and kurtosis to a range 
between -2 and 2. In cases where data were standardized, all z scores below -3.29.and 
above 3.29 were deemed outliers and modified to -3.29 and 3.29 respectively, after which 
standardized scores were re-computed (see Tabachn'ick & Fidell, 2012).
Normative Congruence. To calculate the normative-congruence score, I first 
aggregated all variables across time by computing individuals’ mean levels of implicit 
and explicit ftAch, rcPow, and wAff across eight weeks. I verified that I could reliably
THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE 24
treat each week’s score as though it were a single item in an eight-item measure by 
running an unconditional multilevel analysis, nesting weeks within persons, with the 
weekly score as the dependent variable. The intraclass coefficients (ICC) in such analyses 
indicate how much variance is at the between-person level. In sample 1, the ICCs in the 
implicit motive measure were .59 for achievement, .67 for affiliation and .66 for power, 
and in the explicit motive measure were .46 for achievement, .56 for affiliation, and .51 
for power. In sample 2, the ICCs in the implicit motive measure were .59 for 
achievement, .65 for affiliation and .66 for power, and in the explicit motive measure 
were .44 for achievement, .52 for affiliation, and .57 for power. Thus, with the exception 
of explicit rcAch, all ICCs indicated that there was greater variance at the between-person 
level than the within-person level, implying that aggregate means were moderately 
reliable as dispositional measures.
The aggregate means were converted to z scores, and the implicit-motive z score 
was subtracted from the explicit-motive z score to derive discrepancy scores. These three 
discrepancy scores were converted into absolute values, and the average of the three 
scores was computed. It was then reflected, so that it would indicate congruence rather 
than incongruence. This procedure produced a raw normative-congruence score.
Configural Congruence. To calculate the configural-congruence score, the 
aggregate score of implicit motive strength and explicit motive strength per participant 
was once again derived by taking the average across weeks of scores on the implicit- 
motive and the explicit-motive measure. To create a level-one file for a multilevel model 
o f domains nested within person, each case was then separated into three cases based on
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the three domains. Thus each person was represented by three cases in the data file, one 
case per domain. Each of these cases had a variable for the person’s implicit-motive score 
in a specific domain and the person’s explicit-motive score from the same domain. Using 
this table of motives as level-one of a two-level hierarchical data structure, I conducted a 
multilevel analysis, nesting motives within persons, with the following model: 
Motive-domain Level (level 1):
Explicitti = 7toi + 7ti j(Implicitti) + e tj 
Person Level (level 2) 
ftoi =  Poo +  roi 
n i i  =  P i o  +  r n
Explicitti is the explicit-motive score of person i in domain t and Implicitti is the 
implicit-motive score of person i in domain t. The explicit motive was used as the 
dependent variable because motivational theory suggests that the direction of causality is 
from implicit motives to explicit motives (Thrash et al., 2010). The implicit-motive score 
was entered group-mean centered at level 1. From this analysis, a residual file was 
generated, from which the estimated slope coefficient (7tij) for each participant was 
extracted. Because the slopes were allowed to vary randomly at level 2, this slope was 
unique for each participant, and represented the degree to which that participant was 
congruent across domains. This was the participant’s raw configural-congruence score.
Temporal Congruence. To calculate a temporal-congruence score, I conducted a 
multilevel analysis for each domain, nesting weeks within persons, with the following 
model:
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Week Level (level 1):
Explicittj= 7toi + 7ti j(Implicitti) + e tj 
Person Level (level 2):
TCoi =  Poo +  roi
^i i  =  Pio +  rii
Explicitti is the explicit-motive score of person i in week t and Implicitti is the 
implicit-motive score of person i in week t. The implicit motive was entered group-mean 
centered at level 1. From this analysis, I generated a residual file, from which I extracted 
the estimated slope (nu) for each participant. Because the slopes were allowed to vary 
randomly at level 2, this slope was unique for each participant, and represented the 
degree to which a participant’s explicit motive accurately tracked his or her implicit 
motive across time. I then repeated this analysis for the affiliation domain and the power 
domain. I then averaged a participant’s slope across all three domains to derive that 
participant’s raw temporal-congruence score.
Score Standardization. Because configural and longitudinal congruence scores 
were derived in a similar fashion, a single-unit difference in configural-congruence scores 
was comparable to a single-unit difference in temporal-congruence scores. However, 
normative-congruence scores were computed using a different method, making a single­
unit difference in normative-congruence scores mean something different from a single­
unit difference in the other two types. Raw scores on all three types of congruence were 
therefore standardized. After standardization, a single-unit difference on any type of 
score consistently indicated a difference of one standard deviation.
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Results 
Mean Levels and Inter-Correlations of the Three Congruence Types
Based on the z-score model and the two hierarchical linear models described 
above, I begin by reporting the mean levels of normative, configural and temporal 
congruence, because these mean levels indicate whether people were congruent or 
incongruent on average in each type of congruence. For normative congruence, the mean 
discrepancy score (unreflected and unstandardized) was significantly different from zero 
in Sample 1, ^(149) = 23.458,/? < .001, and Sample 2, r ( l59) = 23.981 ,/? < .001. The 
minimum discrepancy scores in Samples 1 and 2 were . 15 and . 17 respectively, which 
indicates that some participants were highly congruent, although no participant reached 
the perfect congruence score of 0. The maximum discrepancy scores in Samples 1 and 2 
were 2.87 and 2.97 respectively, which indicates that some participants were highly 
incongruent, although no participants reached the outer bound of approximately 6.58, 
which is the greatest possible discrepancy score given a z-score range of -3.29 to 3.29. 
These results are unsurprising, and they replicate what previous studies have found. Note 
that these discrepancy scores were reflected and standardized to derive the normative- 
congruence scores which were used in further analyses.
For configural congruence, the average relationship between explicit motive and 
implicit motives across domains was negative (Sample 1: Pio = -0.092, t = -4.139,/?
< .001; Sample 2: Pio = -.160, t = -9.072, p  < .001), indicating that the average participant 
was configurally incongruent. His. or her explicit-motive configuration was significantly 
negatively correlated with his or her implicit-motive configuration. Thus, the typical
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configural condition is one o f opposition in ranking and proportionality between one’s 
explicit motive profile and one’s implicit motive profile.
For temporal congruence, implicit and explicit motives tended to vary positively 
across time in all three domains: the achievement domain (Sample 1: Pio =.061, t = 5.24, 
p  < .001; Sample 2: Pio = .046, t=  3.23,p  = .002), the affiliation domain (Sample 1: Pio = 
0.061, t = 5.42,/? < .001; Sample 2: pio = .026, t = 2.18,/? = .031), and the power domain 
(Sample 1: Pio = 0.046, t = 4.32,/? < .001; Sample 2: pio = .045, t = 3 A l , p  < .001). These 
results indicate that for the average participant, explicit motives accurately tracked 
implicit motives across time.
Inter-correlations between the types o f congruence were then computed to 
determine the distinctness of each type. The three types of congruence were only weakly 
inter-correlated, and some of these correlations were negative. Configural congruence 
was negatively related to temporal congruence in both sample 1 (r = -.36, p  < .001) and 
sample 2 (r = -.28,/? < .001). Configural congruence was positively related to normative 
congruence in sample 1 (r = .20, p = .014) and marginally so in sample 2 as well (r = .14, 
p  = .093).
Latent Growth Curve Analyses of Well-Being
A latent growth curve model was used to examine whether the three types of 
congruence predicted mean well-being and temporal growth in well-being. Data were 
examined using version 19 of IBM SPSS Amos. Latent growth curve models account for 
variations in missing data by giving added weight to data from participants who 
completed a greater number o f valid submissions. Two sets of latent-curve models were
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run, one in which the three congruence indexes were correlated with the well-being mean 
and slope latent variables, and another in which the three congruence variables were 
modeled as simultaneous predictors of those latent variables. The first set provided 
correlations between each congruence type and each measure of well-being. The second 
set provided standardized path coefficients that indicated the unique contribution of each 
congruence type to the prediction of well-being. The second set o f analyses was run to 
determine whether each type of congruence made a significant contribution after the 
other types were controlled for.
Figure 1 illustrates the model used for the first set of analyses. Positive affect is 
the dependent variable in the figure, but this template was used for all five measures of 
well-being. The model estimates positive affect scores on particular weeks as a linear 
function of a mean (M) latent variable, a slope (S) latent variable, and a uniqueness (error) 
term. Weekly measurements of positive affect are indicated by the w lpa through w8pa 
variables. Whereas a standard growth curve model has loadings of 1,1,1... 1 on an 
intercept factor and loadings of 0 ... 1 on a slope factor, this model has loadings that are 
centered at 0 so as to estimate means instead of initial values. The double-headed arrows 
denote that the coefficients represent first-order correlations. Figure 2 illustrates the 
model used for the second set of analyses, in which the predictors were entered 
simultaneously, as in a multiple regression model. The single-headed arrows indicate this 
difference. The disturbance terms dl and d2 indicate variance that is not meaningful for 
the estimation of the mean and slope.
The results of the first and second sets of analyses for PA, NA, satisfaction with
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life, vitality, and self-actualization are reported in Table 1. In sample 2, positive affect 
and vitality had no variance in their slopes; the slope latent variables were trimmed in 
these two cases. Fit indices are reported in Table 2. The fit was adequate or good for all 
variables except NA, where it was only somewhat satisfactory.
Normative congruence inconsistently predicted mean well-being across the two 
samples, both in terms of correlations and standardized path coefficients. In sample 1, it 
was positively correlated with mean PA, SWLS, vitality and self-actualization, which 
accords with previous research, and all of these relationships were statistically significant. 
But in sample 2, its relationship with well-being was non-significant, except for one case 
o f marginal significance, where it predicted mean self-actualization. It did not predict 
well-being slope in either study.
Configural congruence consistently predicted greater well-being in both samples 
both in terms of correlations and standardized path coefficients. It was a uniquely robust 
predictor of mean PA,-SWLS, Vitality and self-actualization, reaching a significance 
level of less than .001 in all o f these cases. In sample 1, it also predicted the slopes of PA, 
SWLS, vitality and self-actualization, and in sample 2 it predicted the slope of self- 
actualization, but not SWLS. (Due to insufficient variance, its relationship with PA slope 
and vitality slope could not be modeled in sample 2).The only unexpected finding 
pertaining to configural congruence was that it positively predicted NA slope in one 
sample, but this result was only marginally significant. Moreover, this unusual finding 
was not found in sample 1, and it is likely a random occurrence.
Temporal congruence consistently predicted lower well-being across both
THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE 31
samples in terms of correlations and standardized path coefficients. It predicted all 
indicators of well-being in the negative direction in sample 1, and this pattern of findings 
was replicated in sample 2, but some coefficients did not reach significance in the latter 
case. Uniquely among the congruence types, it positively and robustly predicted NA; it 
also negatively predicted the four measures of positive well-being. Although robust in 
sample 1, these findings were weak in sample 2, with four of the five coefficients 
reaching only marginal levels of significance. However, the pattern of temporal- 
congruence findings across both samples was identical with regard to the mean, and 
temporal congruence was a predictor of NA slope in sample 2 as well. The only 
discordant finding regarding temporal congruence was that it was weakly related to 
positive growth in SWLS in sample 2— but this finding was marginally significant and 
likely a coincidence.
In summary, normative congruence was inconsistent across the two samples, 
evincing a significant association with well-being only in sample 1. In contrast, 
configural congruence was strongly associated with greater average well-being and 
greater well-being growth in both samples, while temporal congruence was moderately 
associated with lower average well-being and— in one sample— with well-being decline.
Discussion
The three types o f congruence were distinct from one another, they had different 
average levels among participants, and they played different roles in predicting well­
being. None of the types of congruence was highly correlated with any other type of 
congruence, and this distinctness suggests that there is little justification for researchers
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to continue focusing on normative congruence. Indeed, normative congruence may be the 
least useful type, given that its relationship with well-being was inconsistent across 
samples. Researchers may benefit instead from focusing on configural congruence in 
cross-sectional studies, and both configural and temporal congruence in longitudinal 
studies.
Types of Congruence as Predictors of Well-Being
All three types of congruence were predictors of mean well-being to some degree, 
but, in accordance with prior research, findings regarding normative well-being were 
inconsistent— in sample 1, it was positively related to well-being, but in sample 2 it had a 
null relationship with well-being. As noted earlier, the method for computing normative 
congruence has weaknesses which make it arbitrary and unreliable, evident in the varying 
coefficients pertaining to normative congruence across both samples in the current study. 
In contrast, the positive role of configural congruence and the negative role of temporal 
congruence were strikingly consistent.
Configural congruence had the most robust association with average well-being 
and growth in well-being. This association is consistent with the fact that configurally 
congruent persons have prioritized their explicit motives such that they are directing their 
greatest explicit motivational volition in accordance with their strongest dispositional 
implicit motive. The precision with which configural congruence predicts well-being may 
arise from the fact that configural congruence ignores information about one’s 
cumulative amount of motivation. Some people may have less cumulative energy at the 
explicit level than average, and will therefore be low in normative congruence. However,
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this explicit energy may be apportioned in accord with their implicit profiles, which 
would cause the highest amount of energy to be devoted to pursuits that correspond to the 
most compelling implicit needs. Because configural congruence captures this type of 
implicit-explicit correspondence while disregarding information about how much 
cumulative energy one has, it follows that configural congruence was a robust predictor 
o f well-being. Given that configural congruence not only predicted well-being means but 
well-being slopes, our findings suggest that configural congruence was not merely a 
correlate, but also a cause of greater well-being.
Temporal congruence, in contrast, was a negative predictor of well-being. One 
reason for this contrast could be that temporal congruence does not represent sensitivity 
to need means but rather sensitivity to need variations, which are not the same thing. An 
aggregate sensitivity to need means is more likely to predict an implicit-explicit 
alignment, but sensitivity to need variation is merely likely to predict that everyday 
decisions will reflect the relative strength of the corresponding motive at the time the 
decision is made. Because major life choices have a greater impact than everyday 
decisions, it follows that temporal congruence did not positively predict well-being.
Temporal congruence may represent a maladaptive form of goal seeking in which 
one pays too much attention to goals in the local time frame and too little attention to 
goals in the global time frame. It may also represent an inefficient, unproductive 
diffusion of effort, given that time is being managed not strategically but impulsively. 
Such a diffusion of effort would predict goal-related failures, which would accord with 
the finding that temporal congruence alone predicted greater NA.
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Configural Congruence vs. Temporal Congruence
Why did configural congruence starkly contrast with temporal congruence as a 
predictor of well-being? And why was configural congruence negatively correlated with 
temporal congruence? There are five possibilities to consider. First, people who are high 
in configural congruence may achieve goals more efficiently because they exert more 
sustained effort to achieve goals, whereas people who are high in temporal congruence 
only exert effort on occasions when they are implicitly motivated. Thus, cognitive self­
management may help people who are high in configural congruence achieve their goals 
with greater efficiency and a higher rate of success.
Second, configural congruence and temporal congruence may arise through 
different psychological mediators. Theoretically, people who are configurally congruent 
have achieved the correct prioritization of their explicit goals such that they realize which 
explicit goals deserve the most attention. They may then commit to these explicit goals 
and strive to maintain steadiness in their goal pursuit even on the occasions when their 
implicit motive lags. Thus, they are likely to be higher in identity achievement and low in 
identity moratorium (Marcia, 1966), two factors which are plausible mediators between 
configural congruence and well-being. In contrast, people who are temporally congruent 
have the ability to notice fluctuations in implicit motive strength, an ability that may arise 
through mediational processes associated with mindfulness and private body 
consciousness. Although there is no theoretical basis for considering the first set of 
mediators (identity achievement and identity moratorium) to be opposed to the second set 
of mediators (mindfulness and private body consciousness), it is possible that if  both sets
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are operative, people who are high in identity achievement may not attend to the 
information they receive through mindfulness and private body consciousness, because 
they are cognitively focused on goals that outweigh temporarily arising needs. In contrast, 
people who are high in identity moratorium are constantly exploring alternatives, and
greater awareness o f temporarily arising needs may aggravate this exploratory tendency
I
to an unhealthy degree.
Third, because temporal and configural congruence are independent, a large 
degree of temporal congruence cannot help individuals solve configural problems. In fact, 
temporal congruence maintains implicit-explicit relationships across tim e,\o if a person 
has configural problems, those problems could be sustained by temporal congruence. In 
Figure 3 ,1 have illustrated this effect by showing the time series of three hypothetical 
persons who differ from one another in their level of configural congruence ir temporal
congruence. This diagram at the top shows how a configural discrepancy canljDe
j
maintained by high temporal congruence. In this person’s first motive domain] the 
explicit motive accurately tracks the implicit motive— rising in the same propirtion 
across weeks— and in the second and third domains, motivation is stable. But E his person
never attains configural congruence because he or she was incongruent at the outset.
. ,  1
Fourth, people who are high in temporal congruence may not only be ssnsitive to 
need variation, but they may also arrive at a meta-awareness o f their sensitivity to need 
variation. Thus, they may perceive themselves as having unstable identities, a sdf-
»i
perception that predicts lower well-being even on occasions when the perceivtfi changes 
are positive (Keyes, 2000; Keyes & Ryff, 2000).
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Fifth, the critical difference between configural congruence and temporal 
congruence could be their different average levels. The average level of configural 
congruence was negative in both samples, indicating that the baseline configural state 
was one in which congruence had yet to be achieved. Participants with higher configural- 
congruence scores had transcended this baseline state—possibly reaching the state of 
identity achievement— and were thus more likely than the remainder of the sample to 
experience greater well-being. The average level o f temporal congruence, however, was 
positive in both samples. Thus, the baseline temporal state was one in which a moderate 
degree o f temporal congruence had already been attained. Participants with higher 
■; temporal-congruence scores had not attained anything that the average participant was 
lacking.
Thus, temporal congruence may not be a desirable form of congruence, but rather 
a problematic lack of the flexibility one needs in daily life, where it is sometimes 
necessary to expend volitional energy in order to maintain explicit motivation levels. 
People who are high in temporal congruence may lack such volitional energy because 
they lack the kind of goal commitment that arises from the attainment of configural 
congruence, a hypothesis which accords with the fact that configural and temporal 
congruence are negative correlated.
Limitations and Conclusion
Because the current study was an eight-week longitudinal study, each participant 
gave us data at eight (or fewer) time points about their explicit and implicit motives. 
Measurement on multiple occasions allowed the computation of an aggregate score on
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each implicit and explicit motive that was more reliable than a datum from a single 
occasion. Such reliability enhanced the precision of the normative- and configural- 
congruence scores, but it did not enhance temporal-congruence scores; for temporal- 
congruence scores, the computation relied on only one datum per week. Thus, one 
limitation of our study is that temporal congruence was measured less reliably than 
normative and configural congruence, a limitation that is inherent to the construct of 
temporal congruence.
Another limitation of this study is that motivation was measured in only three 
domains, a restriction which decreased the reliability of configural congruence 
measurement. However, the use of these three domains accords with prior research in the 
field, an accordance which was particularly important given that our aim was to be 
methodologically corrective. The use of three domains was also limiting because each 
domain encompassed several facets that are undifferentiated in such a broad, tripartite 
classification schema. Thus, the inclusion of more domains would have increased 
precision.
Because prior research on motive congruence has relied on the normative 
measurement model, our findings suggest that a correction is needed in the accepted 
methodology for measuring congruence. Specifically, configural congruence, which 
proved to be much more robust, may be the ideal type o f congruence to measure, not only 
for the prediction of well-being, but also for research into moderators of individual 
differences in congruence. In addition, future researchers would benefit from measuring 
temporal congruence— its association with poor well-being suggests that it may be a
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dispositional causal factor as well.
Normative congruence, itself a normative method in past research, appropriately 
served as a norm against which two new forms of congruence could be compared and 
contrasted. The resulting contrasts point out that any method itself can serve as a metric 
against which new methods can be compared and contrasted. The results are also a 
reminder that a statistical model, once widely adopted, can lead to the persistent 
measurement of just one facet of a larger construct across several decades of research. 
The introduction of new models can shed light on the limitations of the former model, 
and not only drive statistical progress but also conceptual progress by revealing the 
construct’s other facets.
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Table 2
Fit Indicators fo r  Growth Curve Model Analyses
49
Chi-square d f TLI CFI RMSEA
Sample 1
PA 77.71 56 0.95 0.96 0.049
NA 116.31 56 0.85 0.87 0.082
SWLS 141.62 56 0.93 0.94 0.098
Vitality 59.07 56 0.99 0.99 0.019
Self-actualization 126.30 56 0.89 0.91 0.089
ample 2
PA 81.69 62 0.86 0.97 0.046
NA 98.85 56 0.87 0.89 0.071
SWLS 104.28 56 0.95 0.96 0.076
Vitality 98.03 62 0.93 0.93 0.063
Self-actualization 120.87 56 0.92 0.93 0.088
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Normative
Congruence
Temporal
Congruence
Figure 1. Model Used for Latent Growth Curve Analysis with Correlations. W lpa 
through W8pa denote weekly measures of positive affect. The weightings o f the paths 
from the slope from -3.5 to 3.5 are to make the intercept represent the person mean..
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Temporal Configure!
Congruence
Normative
Congruence
Figure 2. Model Used for Latent Growth Curve Analysis with Standardized Path 
Coefficients. W lpa through W8pa denote weekly measures of positive affect. The 
weightings o f the paths from the slope from -3.5 to 3.5 are to make the intercept represent 
the person mean.
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motive
Figure 3. Hypothetical time-series of three persons with varying levels of temporal and 
configural congruence. Numbers on the X-axis indicate the three motive domains. Black 
and white bars represent implicit and explicit motives respectively.
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Appendix A
Trimmed Version of Multi-Motive Grid (Short)(MMG-S; Sokolowski et al. 2000)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a seven-point numbered scale 
from 1 (no) to 7 (yes).
On the following pages, you will see a set of pictures depicting all kinds o f everyday 
situations. We did not choose very clear and detailed pictures because we want you to use 
your imagination in guessing what might be going on in these pictures. Please try to put 
yourself in the position of one of the persons who are shown in these pictures. Below 
these pictures, you will also find a set of statements describing the way people could 
think and feel in this situation. Please decide for each statement how well it describes this 
situation, and indicate your response by choosing a number from 1 (NO) to 7 (YES). 
Please do not think about a single statement too long and try to follow your spontaneous 
impression.
1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Being afraid of being overpowered by other people
3. Hoping to get in touch with other people
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1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Anticipating to lose standing
3. Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while
4. Hoping to get in touch with other people
1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Being afraid of being rejected by others
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while
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1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
3. Being afraid of being overpowered by other people
4. Hoping to get in touch with other people
1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Being afraid o f being rejected by others
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Being afraid o f being boring to others
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2
1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Trying to influence other people
5. Hoping to acquire a good standing
1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Being afraid of being boring to others
5. Trying to influence other people
6. Hoping to get in touch with other people
7. Hoping to acquire a good standing
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1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Being afraid of being rejected by others
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Trying to influence other people
5. Hoping to acquire a good standing
1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Trying to influence other people
3. Hoping to get in touch with other people
4. Hoping to acquire a good standing
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1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Trying to influence other people
5. Hoping to acquire a good standing
1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Trying to influence other people
3. Hoping to get in touch with other people
4. Hoping to acquire a good standing
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Appendix B
Measure of Explicit Motives (derived from Sheldon et al., 2001)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a five-point numbered scale from 1 
{not at all) to 5 {very much).
This week, I have felt an impulse or desire to:
1. successfully complete difficult tasks and projects
2. have a sense o f contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for
3. be a person whose advice others seek out and follow
4. take on and master hard challenges
5. be close and connected with other people who are important to me
6. strongly influence others' beliefs and behavior
7. be capable in what I do
8. have a strong sense of intimacy with the people I spend time with
9. have strong impact on what other people do
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Appendix C
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a five-point scale with these five 
anchors: very slightly or not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, extremely.
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then indicate to what extent you feel this way today.
Today. I-feel...
1. interested
2. distressed
3. excited
4. upset
5. strong
6. guilty
7. scared
8. hostile
9. enthusiastic
10. proud
11. irritable
12. alert
13. ashamed
14. inspired
15. nervous
16. determined
17. attentive
18. jittery
19. active
20. afraid
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Appendix D
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a seven-point numbered scale 
from 1 {strongly disagree) to 7 {strongly agree).
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
regarding how you feel today.
Today. I feel that...
1. In most ways, my life is close to ideal.
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
3. I am satisfied with my life.
4. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.
5. I have gotten the important things I want in life.
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Appendix E
Subjective Vitality Scale (Ryan & Frederick, 2007)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a five-point numbered scale from 
1 (inot at all true) to 5 (very true).
Please respond to the following items concerning how you feel today.
1. I feel alive and vital.
2. I don’t feel very energetic.
3. I feel so alive I just want to burst.
4. I have energy and spirit.
5. I am looking forward to each new day.
6. I feel alert and awake.
7. I feel energized.
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Appendix F 
Self-Actualization Scale (Sheldon et al., 2001)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a five-point numbered scale from 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Please respond to the following items in terms of how you feel today.
Today, I feel
1. that I am "becoming who I really am."
2. a sense o f deeper purpose in life.
3. a deeper understanding of myself and my place in the universe.
